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A core of neurobiological mechanisms is implicated in different forms of pain. Fabbro and Crescentini 
(2014) show that this fact is significant both on the scientific level and on the philosophical level. Their main 
philosophical claim is that the existence of a neural circuit devoted to the experience of time suggests that 
time might not be real. An upshot would be that the objects which populate the world of our experience 
might not be real either, and hence the attachment to them and the mechanisms of pain for the separation 
from them that were developed through evolution would be misplaced. By contrast, in their view, we 
inhabit a Heraclitean or Buddhist world of processes: indeed, by inhibiting our time-circuits, mindful 
meditation releases us from perceiving reality as a world of objects and thereby reliefs us from pain. Fabbro 
and Crescentini remark on a limitation of attempts to employ mindful meditation as a pain killer in clinical 
contexts: a long time of meditation practice is needed for a subject to be able to alleviate pain through that 
method. 
The philosophical implications of Fabbro and Crescentini’s essay are far reaching, and can be further 
developed. In the western philosophical tradition following Heraclitus, philosophers (e.g. Plato and 
Aristotle) tried to reconcile his view that reality is a flux with the recognition that, even assuming that there 
are only processes, processes still have individuality and give rise to consistent unities. We can still make 
sense of this thought: pain evolved since the processes which we call animals are structures within 
whatever happens to constitute the flux underlying them. Such structures developed attachments and 
pain, and it is these structures which we humans are practically concerned about. The point was taken over 
in subsequent traditions, such as both anti- or non-Christian Platonists, like Plotinus (Armstrong 2013), and 
Christian thinkers, like Augustin (Samek 1981, Teske 1995), the great difference among them 
notwithstanding. They recognized a ground of reality which only properly speaking exists, and distinguished 
it from other levels of reality – e.g., the objects of our experience –, which exist only in so far as they are 
based on that ground. Time – in their view – exists only at dependent levels of reality, e.g. in the reality of 
our experience (Turetzky 1998). Hence, the existence of the objects of our experience is ambivalent: it 
cannot be completely denied, but it is not ultimately real. In their view, we must live in the world of our 
experience, but we should not develop attachment to it. On the practical level, this meant learning to 
accept and endure sufferance and pain: this approach to life was prominent in the western world, both pre- 
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and post-Christian (Kuuttila 2004). How these philosophical approaches affected the perception and the 
bearing of pain in the West? Historians have recently started to address this issue (Cohen 2010, Dormandy 
2006, Moscovo 2012, Thernstorm 2010). Such studies present a wide range of attitudes and approaches 
towards reality and correlated experiences of pain. The ensuing picture can open empirical questions which 
could further articulate our understanding of the physiology of pain, and, thereby, suggest approaches 
which could overcome the limitations of mindful meditation in clinical contexts. 
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